In hospital merger cases, the courts have often based geographic market areas on patient flow criteria. Given patient heterogeneity and the importance of distance to hospital and health plan restrictions on hospital choice, Capps et al. (2003a) show that potential market power effects can be understated. While willingness-to-pay(WTP) measures derived from individual choice models provide an alternative assess ment, antitrust law is, however, framed in terms of the likely price effects of mergers. This paper examines the connection between health plan prices and WTP that results from bargaining between managed care plans and hospitals. Empirically, we use merger cases in Florida and New York State to evaluate the accuracy of pre-merger predictions from patient-level choice models to assess mergers' effects on patients' aggregate WTP. Employing data available before a merger has occurred, we find that this method can pro vide reliable predictions of patients' post-merger willingness-to-pay, and thereby help inform the pre-merger investigation concerning likely price effects. provide an alternative assessment, antitrust law is, however, framed in terms of the likely price effects of mergers. This paper examines the connection between health plan prices and WTP that results from bargaining between managed care plans and hospitals. Empirically, we use merger cases in Florida and New York State to evaluate the accuracy of pre-merger predictions from patientlevel choice models to assess mergers' effects on patients' aggregate WTP. Employing data available before a merger has occurred, we find that this method can provide reliable predictions of patients' post-merger willingness-to-pay, and thereby help inform the pre-merger investigation concerning likely price effects.
Introduction
The hospital market experienced a surge in mergers and consolidations during the 1990s.
Over 45% of U.S. hospitals were involved in mergers between 1990 and 1998 (Jaspen, 1998) . During this period, courts often accepted the Elzinga/Hogarty (E/H) patient flow criteria to define the relevant hospital geographic market area.
1
In doing so, the courts agreed with the defendant's claims of a relatively large market area, and this ruling may have played a significant role in the loss of cases by Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ).
2
This paper evaluates a recently proposed market area approach: the willingness-to-pay (WTP) methodology proposed in Capps et al. (2003a) , Town and Vistnes (2001) , and Capps et al. (2001) .
3 Compared to previous methods, the willingness-to-pay methodology considers the merger's impact from micro-data on patient choices of hospital care, thus affording a richer recognition of the relevant impacts across heterogeneous patients and local areas much smaller than typical antitrust markets. Based on patients' preferences revealed by their actual choice behavior, we can evaluate welfare effects by how much more patients are willing to pay to include the merged hospitals in their choice set, and by inference, the effect of the merger on hospital prices.
The application of this methodology is a rather recent development in health economics. It has not been established how well an empirical model based on this approach performs in predict ing post-merger impact or whether it might be a useful tool in merger analysis. Because merger challenges must be decided beforehand, it is worthwhile to consider the predictive properties of this approach under the constraints present in investigations limited by pre-merger data. We use patient discharge and other publicly-provided data to investigate, with hindsight, the reliability of this methodology in case studies from Florida and New York.
This paper addresses a number of policy and econometric issues. Section 2 examines the relevance for antitrust of willingness-to-pay measures and shows how changes in this measure relate to changes in insurance prices that result from Nash bargaining between health plans and hospitals.
In Section 3, we estimate models using this methodology in the context of hospital merger case, one 1
Bargaining between MCO and Hospitals
The analysis of pricing in hospital markets must recognize the unique role of intermediation by payers on behalf of patients. Capps et al. (2003a) consider the hospital market as an 'option demand' market in which managed care organizations (MCO) negotiate with hospitals for contracts to provide care on behalf of customer/members.
5
Contracts determine what local hospitals are included in the network and the payments obligations of the plan. Consumers (or employers as their representative) then choose which network to join.
While the consumers' hospital choices may be restricted by the network, prices play little or no part in the choices made when episodes requiring hospital care arise. Members of the MCO plans, after paying the premium, face no variation in out-of-pocket prices as long as they go to a network hospital.
6
Patients choose hospitals based upon non-price characteristics of the hospital including distance to the patient's home, services offered, and ownership (Town and Vistnes (2001) ).
With empirical parameters estimated from a multinomial demand model, one can calculate patients' willingness-to-pay (WTP) for access to hospitals in the network.
The separation of consumption choices from the payments or fees for service in this market does not remove potential concerns about market power effects resulting from mergers. In antitrust law, hospital merger analysis remains focused on the effects on prices. But the usefulness of WTP measures for antitrust analysis requires some understanding of its link to prices, that has not previously been shown. We present a simple heuristic model to illustrate how hospital 'prices' relate patients' WTP and to show how hospital mergers may affect prices in option demand markets. The model in this section is adapted from Capps et al. (2003a) , Capps et al. (2001) and McFadden (1998) .
Unlike Medicare and fee-for-service plans, managed care organizations rely more on per-member per-month payments with hospitals.
7
For example, in the US vs. Evanston Northwestern Healthcare, the FTC official argued that managed health care plans no longer could negotiate lower prices after the merger by selectively contracting with either Evanston Northwestern or Highland Park Hospital. The merged system allegedly exploited its bargaining position to negotiate higher prices worth millions of dollars (Guerin-Calvert et al., 2005 ). � � utility individual i gets from going to hospital j is:
where y i is individual i's income. The payment r is the capitation payment reimbursed to hospitals per member, or, equivalently the premium paid by enrollees. The payment r is assumed to be actuarially fair and to be adequate to cover the cost of the hospital contracts in the network that the MCO arranged. For a three hospital network, r = r 1 + r 2 + r 3 covers the payments made to hospital 1, 2 and 3. a ij is a vector of hospital j's characteristics, including its ownership, teaching status, nursing and capital (or equipment) intensity, services offered by hospital j, the travel time from patient i's home to hospital j, the patient's socioeconomic characteristics and the disease severity. When an existing MCO plan includes hospital j as well as k in the network, a patient will choose hospital j over k if:
Under the assumption that ε ij and ε ik are independently-distributed, extreme value random variables, the probability that patient i chooses hospital j, given the network G is:
We analyze the MCO's problem by considering first what determines the selection of hospitals for the network when the payments r are exogenously given, and second, when r is explicitly negotiated. The expected maximum utility patient i can get from network G, given r, can be shown to satisfy 8 :
j∈G j∈G
The MCO's objective is to maximize its enrollees' total expected utility by choosing the configuration of the network, given r:
This result is a property of the standard extreme value distribution, ignoring the Euler's constant(-.57722) which does not affect the maximization problem. See e.g. Haab and McConnell (2003) and McFadden (1997) .
For example, with three available hospitals and two hospitals already in the network, the MCO can negotiate to include the third hospital in its network if additional costs r 3 * N are less than its additional benefit to the enrollees:
This inequality can be simplified to:
The term on the right side of the inequality condition is the willingness-to-pay for hospital j, measuring the contribution of hospital j in network G to the aggregate patients' utility. Specifically, it measures the change in the maximum utility 9 , summed over all patients, when hospital j is added to the network, given that the remaining hospitals in G are already present. We denote W T P j i (G, a ij ) for the WTP of hospital j to patient i and W T P j (G) is the WTP of hospital j for all N enrollees in MCO network G. Combining equation 6 with 3 gives the individual, i = 1, . . . , N , and the aggregate WTP values:
Similarly, W T P jk (G), the joint WTP of hospital j and k in MCO network G, i.e. the additional utility hospitals j and k together bring to the network:
Constraints that would be satisfied when the MCO includes all three hospitals 10 can be written as:
9 Alternatively, it is the change in the maximum expected utility, considered prospectively, based on the probability distri bution of illness or injury events and before the patient's medical conditions are known. 10 Additional four constraints are
It can be shown that when the three conditions in 9 hold, these last four will also hold.
� � � �
The previous discussion assumes that r, the capitation rates paid to hospitals, are set ex ogenously. The second question to consider now is how those rates are determined under the MCO contract. We imagine a bilateral negotiation between MCO and each of the three hospitals and evaluate the Nash bargaining solutions. The Nash bargaining model is appealing for many reasons.
The cooperative solution concept does not exclude the effect of competition among hospitals. As number of available hospitals in the market grows, the WTP for any given hospital will likely be reduced, leading to lower payments from the MCO. The Nash bargaining model abstracts from transaction costs, assumes that negotiations involving any efficient contract will succeed, and pro duces a contract where the surplus from trading be split evenly between parties. While the even split feature of the model may understate the bargaining power of either MCOs or hospitals, it is a well recognized solution.
11
We assume if the hospital j is excluded from the network, it can earn Π 0j from other sources.
If it is included, however, hospital j can earn r j * N − c j * Q j + Π 0j ., where Q j is the number of patients served. As for the MCO, the most socially efficient network configuration is to include all hospitals available into the network. 12 Therefore, the alternative for MCO is G/j if disagreement occurs.
13 Nash bargaining between the MCO and hospital j solves the following:
Assuming an interior solution, the equilibrium price is:
This result says that bargaining produces capitation rate that depends directly on the WTP and the costs of hospital care. Moreover, it leads to an equal split of the surplus between profit and net WTP.
11 A large variety of bargaining situations might be appropriate to consider. Binmore et al. (1986) establishes the linkage between the Nash bargaining solution and sequential strategic approaches. Studies in health economics including Ellison and Snyder (2001) and Gal-Or (1999) also use the Nash Bargaining Solution to model the negotiation between suppliers and buyers.
12 From a social planner's point of view, the total utility for a network consisting of all hospitals
, the total utility after excluding hospital j. 13 The Nash bargaining solution results using the assumption of Ellison and Snyder (2001) that each hospital conjectures that all other hospitals will bargain successfully with the MCO in equilibrium.
Consider next what happens when hospital 1 and 2 merge and negotiate jointly with the MCO. The Nash bargaining solution between the merged hospitals and MCO involves:
In this case, the post-merger hospital prices are:
2N
The combined payments to the two merged hospitals are higher following merger because W T P 12 (G) > W T P 1 (G) + W T P 1 (G). The extent of the price effect will depend on the level of costs; constraints in (9) require costs in the range 0 ≤ c 1 * Q 1 ≤ W T P 1 and 0 ≤ c 2 * Q 2 ≤ W T P 2 .
Letting ΔW T P 12 (G) = W T P 12 (G) − W T P 1 (G) − W T P 2 (G), the percentage increase in prices is bounded by :
For antitrust purposes, equation 13 has important implications. It suggests that the WTP captures a key leverage factor in the negotiation between MCO and hospitals. With Nash Bargain ing, the MCO and hospitals will split the WTP. After merger, however, WTP is increased because
Thus, while the WTP itself depends on the availability of alternative hospitals and their competition for inclusion in the network, mergers that effect large changes in WTP may result in corresponding increase in the rates paid to hospitals for patient care that would raise valid antitrust concerns about harm to consumers of the affected health plans.
2.2. MCO-Hospital negotiations over reimbursement rates for services. We can extend the model to consider the case where, instead of capitation payments, MCOs and hospitals negotiate over per-unit prices that the hospital receive as reimbursement for services. This formulation comes closer to the kind of negotiation commonly attributed to MCOs. We assume again that if the hospital j is excluded from the network, it can earn Π 0j from other sources. If it is included, however, hospital j can earn Π 1j = p j * Q j − c j * Q j + Π 0j . Q j is the number of patients served and is determined ex post by the logit demand model of hospital choice. In general, Q j will depend on the number and characteristics of other hospitals in the network.
� � �

�
Nash bargaining between the MCO and the first hospital, hospital 1 solves the following:
where Q j are the number of patients who choose hospital j in the three hospital network, while Q � 2 and Q � 3 are the patient volumes of hospital 2 and 3, respectively, when the contract with hospital 1 fails. The maximization problems yields three equations in the prices, p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 :
These conditions, compared to those in the capitation rate bargaining problem, include some extra terms because, in the event the contract with any one hospital fails, the MCO requires reallocating patients to the other hospitals in the network and that would change the cost of the plan whenever p i = c j . We consider the symmetric case where all hospitals are identical. Assume a i1 = a i2 = a i3 = a i and c 1 = c 2 = c 3 = c. The solution to the system of equations is:
where W T P j is the marginal willingness to pay for any one hospital. The solution thus shows that each hospital extract their marginal WTP and earns profits Π = N ln(
). While this example assumes three identical hospitals, when there are many hospitals, prices converge to competitive levels. When the number of hospital is J, it can be shown that in a symmetric case, p = J ln( J )+c.
J−1
As the number of hospitals increases, hospital prices approach equality with marginal cost c.
The configuration chosen for the network depends on the utility of the MCO, given the set of hospitals and prices. For instance, including G = (1, 2, 3) yields utility to the MCO plan members
With prices determined by the Nash bargaining solution, this expression simplifies to:
As long as � N (a i − c) > N ln( 9 ) the utility from a network composed of G = (1, 2, 3) will one. This difference in the three hospital case is equal to i=1 ln( ((3)(1)) 2 ) = N * 1.778 > 0.
14 Now assume hospital 1 and hospital 2 merge. The post-merger Nash bargaining problem for hospitals 1 and 2 jointly is:
For hospital 3, the bargaining problem is:
p 3
These maximization problems yield two equations in the prices, p 1 , p 2 , and p 3 .
Assume again the symmetric case, where a i1 = a i2 = a i3 = a i and c 1 = c 2 = c 3 = c. The solution to the system of equations is:
14 In general, the difference between U (G =, ..., J + 1) and U (G = 1, ..., J), i.e. the marginal utility to the MCO from including the last hospital in the network is
The interpretation of this solution may be expressed in terms of the impact on the cost of the insurance plan. The insurance payment that is required from each MCO enrollee to meet all expenses with these reimbursement rates is equal to:
Compared to the pre-merger cost of insurance p = W T P Q 1 (G) +c, the hospitals receive higher payments that depend on ΔW T P 12 (G) of the combined hospitals:
Thus, costs of insurance mirror the changes in the bargaining strength of the merged hospi tals. To reiterate, we have shown for contracts based on capitation payments to the hospital and those where reimbursement rates are set for hospital care, there is a close correspondence between the merger's effect on WTP and the resulting prices. In acting as intermediary, the MCO seeks the best terms for members as a whole and does not discriminate in setting member fees. The value of the WTP measure is that it imputes effects that can vary considerably by the geographic location of the MCO members. These effects may be overlooked when confining attention to fixed sets of competitors in the market.
Empirical Analysis of Mergers in Palm Beach County, FL and Long Island, NY
We approach the empirical testing by selecting mergers that were likely to reflect significant change in a local hospital market, and for which enough time had elapsed to allow a retrospective analysis. In 1994, Columbia announced the acquisition of HealthTrust. By that time, Columbia operated 195 hospitals and HealthTrust operated 116 hospitals nationwide. The combined company had more than $15 billion in sales, with hospitals in 37 states. (Lutz and Pallarito (1995) We selected these Florida mergers for evaluation because of their size and other reasons.
16
The two acquisitions gave Columbia/HCA control of four hospitals in Palm Beach county. We also analyze the 1997 merger between Long Island Jewish Medical Center and North Shore Health System in New York. This case clearly illustrates the importance of heterogeneity in the patient choice sets within geographic market areas as they are typically defined in hospital merger cases. Before the merger, in 1995, Long Island Jewish Medical Center had 591 beds in service and total assets of $386 million. It was a prestigious teaching hospital serving residents in Queens County and Nassau County. Three miles away was North Shore University Hospital, a 729-bed prestigious teaching hospital, also serving residents in Queens and Nassau County. Its parent firm, North Shore Health System, operated 9 hospitals with 3,231 beds in 1995. Total assets of the nine hospitals were around $1 billion. (Pallarito (1997) .)
The DOJ, in its Complaint filed in District Court, focused mainly on the two hospitals' function as anchor hospitals.
18 Both are prestigious teaching hospitals offering a wide range of high quality services. Residents in Queens and Nassau County all wanted to have at least one of the hospitals in their insurance network. Although there were many other hospitals in this area, none of them had the capacity to substitute as an anchor hospital. Including one of the anchor hospitals in the network signified the quality of the insurance and was essential the insurance plan's marketability. Thus, the merger would prevent the insurance company's ability to substitute one anchor hospital for the other limit their able to negotiate separately with the two hospitals for lower prices. DOJ contended that the merger would force insurance rates to increase by 20%. (McQuiston (1997) .)
In response, the hospital attorney argued that the merger was motivated by efficiency gains and it would be infeasible for the two merged hospitals to significantly increase their market power because they were in a wide geographic market consisting of 42 other hospitals in four counties, including Manhattan. (Bellandi (1997) .)
In the next section, we describe the sampling methods used to select hospitals and patients and identify the variables specified in the analysis. The following sections report the empirical findings for the Palm Beach and the Long Island merger.
3.1. Data Sample and Variables for the Palm Beach Merger. Data for this study are taken from public use sources from Florida that contain financial measures for short-term acute care hospitals as well as patient discharge records covering all inpatient hospital stays. The sampling methods used to select hospitals and patients in Florida yield a market area that includes the 15 acute care hospitals in Palm Beach County, plus 5 other hospitals in neighboring counties that served less than 2 percent of the total patients. To get this result, it must be noted at the outset that the sampling design was subject to certain considerations. Consistent with patient flows analysis, the service area should be self-contained for each hospital under study. This means, first, that the analysis should not overlook any other "outside" hospitals where evidence reveals that patients in the local area are able to choose, and sometimes actually choose, for hospital care. These outside hospitals are a source of competition for the hospitals involved in the merger. Second, the data set should include substantially all of the patients that received services from hospitals involved in the mergers, without restricting those patients by how far away they reside from the hospital.
Unlike the patient flows approach, however, we compute aggregate willingness of patients to pay for access to hospitals within diverse zip-code level choice sets. Varying the hospital choices by small areas allows for considerable heterogeneity within the total service area of any given hospital. We started with a sample containing, with only minor exceptions, a complete set of observa tions on all patients discharged from the four hospitals involved in the mergers. Figure 1 illustrates, in principle, how the market is defined in our study. The four boxes in the middle represent the four hospitals involved in the mergers. First we find all the zip codes for the patients who were discharged from these four hospitals. In this example, patients from zip code 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 received care at the four hospitals. Then, looking at each zip code, we construct the full choice set of hospitals that draw patients from these locations. In the figure, patients from the 6 zip codes also visited hospital A, B, C and D. In the Florida data, there are 16 other hospitals whose service areas overlap our 4 focal hospitals, however, the percent of the hospitals' total discharges included in the sample, i.e. the hospital coverage rates, are low.
�
Some zip codes were excluded if very small numbers of patients are drawn to the four focal hospitals. 19 In the final sample, we account for 90,113 patients in total, over 92% of all patients treated in areas served by these hospitals. Thus, subject to these exclusions, the sample contains essentially all patient discharges in the areas where the four focal hospitals compete. Similar patient choice sets are constructed for the 1997 post-merger data.
After selecting hospitals and patients in our study, we estimate the following conditional logit model with choice sets that vary by patient zip code location:
Where a ij = 0 if choice j is not available to individual i.
where the specification of the explanatory variables closely approximates those in Capps et al.
:
, R j is a vector of hospital j's characteristics, including its control types (for profit, not for profit, or government), teaching status, nursing intensity, capital intensity etc. S j are services offered by hospital j. R j and S j are from hospital financial data collected by state regulators.
20
T ij is the travel time from patient i's home to hospital j. These measures of distance to the hospital are from a public source, www.mapquest.com. The estimated coefficients for the most part, are highly significant, including those associated with dummy variables for for-profit status, nursing intensity, capital intensity, and hospital services offered. As previous research has shown, the travel time to the hospital and its interaction with other terms in the model are all very significant. In general the model is successful in capturing the key features of the choice set, and is broadly consistent with the results obtained in the earlier analysis of Capps et al. (2003) .
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Within the assumptions of the conditional logit model, we can make out-of-sample pre dictions about changes in the willingness-to-pay following a merger. We focus on out-of-sample robustness, i.e. how well the model can predict, prospectively, how much the merger will change the aggregate value of WTP for the combined hospitals.
Prior to knowing what her disease/injury status will be, 24 individual i's WTP to include hospital j in network G is computed by evaluating the potential WTP over her entire set of possible medical conditions Z. Denote p(Z i |y i ) the probability of individual i having disease Z i conditional on her socioeconomic attributes and location. The estimated WTP can be expressed as:
z 23 A few of the point estimates in our model are different from Capps et al. (2003) . The estimated coefficient on travel time to the hospital is smaller in magnitude than the earlier study (-0.068 compared to -0.2562). Moreover, the control variable for hospitals having organ transplant services increases the probability of being chosen by the patient in both papers, but the point estimate of the coefficient on this dummy variable is much larger in our paper (2.163 compared with 0.3693). The point estimates on these variables are not, however, the corresponding marginal effects because they depend on the extensive interaction terms in the model. Therefore, despite the differences, the marginal impacts may be similar.
24 Capps et al. (2003a) refer to this prior as the ex ante WTP, while, after the health status is determined, the individual expresses an ex post WTP.
� � � �
Summing over all patients who have hospital j as an alternative in their choice set gives the population's WTP for hospital j:
Similarly, the predicted post-merger WTP for merged hospital j and k is:
The willingness to pay for hospital j in equation 27 and the predicted WTP change implied by equation 28 are the main products of the model, in turn, affecting the post-merger price changes.
If their measurement is imprecise, the predictions about future price changes will also be unreliable.
To evaluate the reliability of out-of-sample prediction, we predict WTP using pre-merger data, then repeat estimation on post-merger data to calculate the estimated post-merger WTP. Sup pose hospital j and k merge and denote the pre-merger prediction of post-merger WTP, � W T P jk (G).
Next, post-merger data is used to estimate equation 25 and calculate the estimated post-merger WTP for j and k, � W T P jk (G) − � W T P jk (G). The difference is ΔW T P jk (G) = � W T P jk (G), i.e., our measure of the prediction error of the model from the two data sets pre-and post-merger. Tradi tional t-tests or other statistics assume either the difference would have the t-distribution or else one model is a nested version of the other. These conditions are clearly violated in our case. We resolve this problem by using bootstrap methods.
25
The left side of 25 We draw, with replacement, n pseudo samples, each with N observations from the original pre-merger data. Similarly, we create n pseudo samples from the post-merger data. The model is re-estimated for each pseudo-sample, and the repeated estimates are used to obtain � W T P , and take the difference. W T P , as well as post-merger estimate � 26 For comparisons across the two sample years, one further adjustment is necessary to account for the fact that, due to growth, the inpatient volume is different between 1994 and 1997. To accommodate this change, let N 97 the number of patients in 1997, and N 94 is the number in 1994, for the later year, W T P � is multiplied by N 94/N 97 to give a scaled value. This adjustment is equivalent to assuming that there is a neutral, aggregate demand growth, which seems reasonable for the state of Florida during these years.
The mean difference between the ex ante predicted changes and the ex post estimated changes was found to be only 3.9%. Thus, it would appear that this methodology can provide excellent outof-sample prediction, and may be reliable enough for its intended use. The Palm Beach mergers are associated with substantial changes in WTP, on the order of about 20%. Further, as our earlier bargaining analysis suggests, we can infer qualitatively similar profit and price changes within small confidence intervals.
Our results can be compared with the Elzinga/Hogarty (E/H) method. Based on the patient follow criteria, the 15 hospitals in Palm Beach County constitute a relevant geographic market, and all patients are assumed to have access to the full set of hospitals.
27 Consequently, the pre-merger Herfindahl Hirschman Index, HHI is 898, while the post-merger HHI is 984, an increase of only 86 points. Under prevailing merger guidelines, the market is considered to be unconcentrated and these mergers are unlikely to have adverse competitive effects. But the mean change in WTP is 24%, and would signal the need to examine the merger more closely.
The sample used to this point includes patients who are insured under a variety of insurance To alleviate these problems, we have taken a two step approach. First, we estimated the conditional logit model using observations only on Medicare, commercial insurance, HMO, and PPO patients who were non-emergency admissions to obtain the parameters of the choice model. Second, we then use the estimates to calculate the WTP for observations on the remaining, commercial HMO and PPO patient observations. This procedure helps to eliminate the potential confounding effects, because the changes are limited to the sample that contain commercial HMO and PPO patients, 27 The two criteria are termed Little In From Outside (LIFO) and Little Out From Inside (LOFI). In Palm Beach County, FL, LIFO =92% and LOFI = 89% those most directly affected by mergers, and non-emergency patients, those most likely to influence their choice of hospital. Table 5 reports the change in the estimated willingness to pay from pre-merger data to results estimated post-merger based on 100 bootstrap samples. Across the samples, the predicted WTP for HMO and PPO patients are 4.47% higher than the post-merger WTP. Thus, the model seems to be quite stable across time, providing some evidence that analysis conducted before the merger occurs may give insight about the mergers effects. 29 Here, we report empirical results addressing the reliability of the model's out-of-sample WTP prediction, � W T P , from pre-merger data.
Using data drawn from public sources, 30 we again use empirical estimates of the logit model to predict � Next, we use the 1999 post-merger data W T P , the WTP with pre-merger 1996 data. A final set of predictions were conducted using the previous strategy of fitting the logit model using observations only on Medicare, commercial insurance, HMO, and PPO patients who were non-emergency admissions to obtain the parameters of the choice model. These estimates 28 In an expanded sample constructed to test robustness and reported in the appendix, the predicted WTP is 8.67% lower than the post-merger WTP.
29 The separate appendix discusses various sample construction issues, including the selection of hospitals and patients and other properties of the sample. form the basis of the predictions on WTP for observations on the remaining, commercial HMO and PPO patient observations, and are reported in table 7. The results show rather large predicted changes in WTP from the pre-merger data, and indeed, these predictions match the post-merger results quite accurately. Thus, the results confirm, qualitatively, the interpretation provided from the full sample.
In sum, the analysis from the Long Island merger provides some support for the position that these choice model approaches may have good predictive accuracy. It is interesting to compare our results with the changes in HHI determined by patient flow criteria. Queens and Nassau Counties were considered by both parties as the relevant geography, however, the government argued that the two merging hospitals were "anchor" hospitals and competed only against each other, while the defendants argued for the inclusion of all hospitals located in the two counties. If we adopt the defendants position, LIFO = (Local Consumption from Local Supply)/(Local Consumption) = 92% and LOFI = (Local Consumption from Local Supply)/(Local Production)=81%. Based on discharges for the hospitals in these counties, the pre-merger HHI = 567.8574 and the post-merger HHI = 800.8434. Under prevailing guidelines, a merger of this magnitude would be unlikely to cause adverse competitive effects in the market. In contrast, we find the price effects are likely to be substantial, indicating a change in the WTP in excess of 20%.
Conclusions
The value of obtaining estimates of willingness-to-pay (WTP) based on empirical analysis of demand is shown clearly in our bargaining analysis. While the structure is simplified, the results of bargaining in the option demand framework lead to a close correspondence between rates paid to hospitals and the aggregate WTP. Co-located mergers provide hospitals with extra bargaining power in contracts with MCOs and the resulting effects on prices are proportionate to the change in WTP implied by the joint ownership.
Our empirical results lead to two conclusions. First, both mergers in our study were likely to create a sizeable change in WTP, not because there are insufficient numbers of hospitals in the geographic areas, but because many patients residing within faced a more limited set of choices than the set of all hospitals identified by the traditional methods. Second, the empirical approach, when taken prospectively to construct WTP estimates from pre-merger analysis, is reasonably accurate and focus on patients with HMO and commercial insurance, the prediction error is only 1.05%.
It would be constructive to find an alternative method to define hospital market that is consistent with consumer choice theory and provide a stronger foundation for merger analysis. The willingness-to-pay (WTP) methodology provides a promising alternative. The idea itself is not new.
McFadden (1994) used the WTP to evaluate the value of preserving wilderness areas in western United States. Green et al. (1995) compared the WTP method with Contingent Valuation using an experiment on paying for public goods. McFadden (1998) used similar method to measure the public's willingness-to-pay for public transportation improvement. The patient discharge data sets and financial data required for this method are uniform and widely available in many states, so it should be feasible to incorporate this kind of analysis when circumstances require it. This study recommends further research concerning how well the new approach can predict the impact of a merger, and whether the prediction is reliable. Empirical Documentation to accompany"What does willingness-to-pay reveal about hospital market power in merger cases?"
In this document, we describe in detail how samples where constructed from the patient discharge data for each of three samples. While the discharge databases contain complete records of all patient discharges from acute care hospitals, sampling is necessary to implement the empirical choice model to satisfy computational constraints. Further, we investigate how the results change when we increase sample size, i.e. include many more patients and hospitals in the model. We find that the model obtains similar results under alternative sampling frames, although the error rates are somewhat higher (up to 9% error rates) as the sample is expanded. Finally, the construction of the sample for the Long Island merger analysis is discusses.
1.1. Sample Construction for the Palm Beach, Florida analysis. Table 8 reports the cov erage rates, i.e. the percent of the hospital's total discharges included in the final sample for 1994, for patients from the 33 zip codes. As an example, there are in total 3493 patients from zip code 33401 receiving service from 55 hospitals. After excluding hospitals with less than 50 patients for 1994, there are 3258 patients remaining, comprising about 93% of all the patients from zip code 33401. In the total sample, we account for 90113 patients, over 92% of total patients. We will call this sample the "n-4 sample" for purposes of comparison below, because it contains essentially the complete patient population in the areas where the four focal hospitals compete, shown in table 9 in boldface red for those with the colorized copy of this document, whereas the coverage rates for the other 16 peripheral hospitals are relatively low. Similar patient choice sets are constructed for the 1997 post-merger data.
We construct choice sets by assuming that all patients in a given zip code face a fixed set of alternative hospitals and we infer that set from the consumption patterns observed in the discharge data. For example, from zip code 33401, about 95% of the patients went to 6 of the 20 hospitals, each of which accepted more than 50 patients. In this manner, we determined that patients from zip code 33401, for example, have 6 alternatives in their choice set. Each patient's choice set from the 33 zip codes can be defined similarly. Every patient has at least one and at most 4 of the merged hospitals in their choice set. Even with only one, a patient could be affected by the merger since MCO contracts with the merged hospitals are likely to be aggregated over all members and Note: Control indicates Not-for-Profit (NFP), Government (Gov) or for-profit (FP) ownership. The columns indicate whether the hospital offers services or specializes in magnetic resonance imaging (mri), cardiac care (cardio), diseases of nervous system (nerv), respiratory (resp) , labor and delivery (labor), psychiatric care (psych) and organ transplant services (transplant).
1.2. The Expanded sample to test for robustness. A question to be addressed here is the sensitivity of the model's predictions to changes in the sampling design. We explore this issue with an expanded sample, the "n-20 Sample". This sample enlarges the coverage of patient discharges (see table 11 The expanded sample, illustrated in figure 1.2, contains within it the "n-4" sample (shown in the box) but also includes a broader choice set that captures essentially all the patients and zip codes that are relevant to the 16 peripheral hospitals. In this "n-20 Sample", there are 81 additional hospitals that have to be included to construct complete choice sets for the additional zip codes. samples.
1.3. Bootstrap Predictions Based on the "n-20 Sample". In the paper, we presented boot strap results for predictions of the model based on the "n-4" sample. To examine the robustness of these results, a further set of predictions from a new set of conditional logit models was estimated on 100 pseudo-samples based upon the "n-20" sample.
Recall that the analysis of the "n-4 sample" focused on four hospitals that were subject to merger. As shown in table 9, the sample covers over 85% of discharges from the four hospitals.
But for the other 16 hospital the coverage rate is relatively low. In the "n-20" sample we are able to assess the aggregate WTP for all of the 20 hospitals, instead of only the limited ones who were merging because the "n-20" sample covers a large percent of patients for all 20 hospitals ( see table 11 ). Table ? ? compares the estimation results of the logit model using n-4 and n-20 sample. The results from the expanded sample in table 12 yield somewhat less precise forecasts than the 3.9% average error rate obtained from the predictions using the "n-4" sample. Looking at the pre-merger prediction of the WTP relative to the actual post-merger WTP from 1997, the mean error of the model based on the 1994 data is 4.79%. Moreover, table 13 reports additional predictions from models estimated on bootstrap samples excluding patient records for emergency admissions. In the table, the prediction error is -8.67%, somewhat larger than the 4.47% error obtained in the equivalent predictions from the "n-4" sample. Thus the model under-predicts market power effects in this case. In general, the larger "n-20" sample provides some additional statistical efficiency in the coefficient estimates of the model, but would produce more volatile estimates of the effects if the hospital service profiles are quite different and patient preferences over hospital attributes varies as the breadth of the market grows. For example, with the "n-20" sample there are 81 hospitals instead of only 20 in the "n-4" sample. Thus, if the marginal value of hospital service is lower in the expanded sample, that would affect the conditional logit estimates and may result in a higher prediction error. Table 14 . Estimation Results from "n-4" Sample and "n-20" Sample. Note: Control indicates Not-for-Profit (NFP), Government (Gov) or for-profit (FP) ownership. The columns indicate whether the hospital offers services or specializes in magnetic resonance imaging (mri), cardiac care (cardio), diseases of nervous system (nerv), respiratory (resp) , labor and delivery (labor), psychiatric care (psych) and organ transplant services (transplant).
